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inhibit economic growth?
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Abstract
Background: Is existing provision of health services in Europe affordable during the recession or could cuts
damage economic growth? This debate centres on whether government spending has positive or negative
effects on economic growth. In this study, we evaluate the economic effects of alternative types of government
spending by estimating “fiscal multipliers” (the return on investment for each $1 dollar of government
spending).
Methods: Using cross-national fixed effects models covering 25 EU countries from 1995 to 2010, we quantified
fiscal multipliers both before and during the recession that began in 2008.
Results: We found that the multiplier for total government spending was 1.61 (95% CI: 1.37 to 1.86), but there was
marked heterogeneity across types of spending. The fiscal multipliers ranged from −9.8 for defence (95% CI: -16.7 to −3.0)
to 4.3 for health (95% CI: 2.5 to 6.1). These differences appear to be explained by varying degrees of absorption of
government spending into the domestic economy. Defence was linked to significantly greater trade deficits (β = −7.58,
p=0.017), whereas health and education had no effect on trade deficits (peducation=0.62; phealth= 0.33).
Conclusion: Our findings indicate that government spending on health may have short-term effects that make recovery
more likely.
Keywords: Health spending, Government spending, Economic growth
Background
The Great Recession that beset Europe and North
America since 2007 has sparked widespread debate
about alternative approaches to achieving economic re-
covery. Much of the discussion has centred on the ques-
tion of whether government spending will promote [1-3]
or inhibit economic growth [4,5]. Critics of government
spending argue, first, that such spending has an immedi-
ate effect of increasing debt which, if associated with a
loss of confidence by investors, will also increase the cost
of servicing that debt as a consequence of increased inter-
est rates [6,7]. Second, they argue that, by “crowding out”
private markets and, by implication, their assumed greater
efficiency, they will inhibit the growth necessary for recov-
ery [8]. In contrast, advocates of greater spending during
recessionary periods, which are characterized by un-
employment and deficits, argue that the effects of short
term increases in borrowing will be compensated for by
higher growth resulting from a high marginal propensity
to consume, generating positive cycles of consumption
and employment growth [9]. Many of these arguments
have been tested empirically. Contrary to what is
claimed by the advocates of austerity, increased debt is
not consistently associated with high interest rates nor
lower economic growth rates [10-12]. Similarly, rather
than crowding out private markets, government spending,
at least on physical infrastructure, seems to increase the
productivity of private capital [13,14]. However, other as-
pects of stimulus spending have been subject to less atten-
tion from researchers.
One aspect that has received less attention is the po-
tential return on government investment in the health
sector. The fiscal multiplier is an estimate of the effect
of government spending on economic growth. A multiplier
greater than 1 corresponds to a positive growth stimulus
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(returning more than $1 for each dollar invested), whereas
a multiplier less than one reflects a net loss from spending.
Prior studies have estimated the aggregate multipliers from
overall government spending [15-19], most notably in a re-
cent study by two senior economists at the International
Monetary Fund that suggested that the multiplier was
greater than one, higher than the previously assumed
multiplier of 0.5-0.6 [20]. It is obvious that some sectors
will have greater capacity to translate additional funds into
new employment opportunities or increase incomes do-
mestically and thus intuitive that such expenditure will
achieve greater fiscal multipliers [16,21]. However, to our
knowledge no study has yet to comparatively estimate the
growth effects of differing types of government spending.
While this paper cannot hope to resolve the debate be-
tween those advocating greater austerity to reduce levels
of debt and those who see government spending as a
way of encouraging recovery (and in turn the debt), it is
possible to examine what any government that wished
to adopt the latter course should spend its money on to
achieve the greatest return on investment. Health, edu-
cation, and social welfare sectors are currently experien-
cing significant cuts in several European countries,
either as a result of political decisions by national gov-
ernments or, in the case of countries subject to bail outs,
by the troika of the European Commission, European
Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund [22].
There is growing evidence that these cuts are having an
adverse effect on the health of populations [23]. The
question we ask here is whether they are also damaging
the prospects for economic growth.
Methods
In the first step of the analysis, we used comparative
cross-national data on sector-specific funding [24] among
25 EU countries from 1995 to 2010 to estimate empirically
the magnitude and direction of fiscal multipliers in health,
defence, education, and other key government spending
sectors (see Table 1 for definitions of budget categories).
To estimate fiscal multipliers empirically in non-
recession periods, we estimated a weighted-average of
country-specific slopes (‘within-country’ variation). Gov-
ernment spending may correlate with unobserved factors
that also independently affect economic growth. To
address potential confounding factors, some studies
apply mathematical simulation models, relying on the-
oretical assumptions [25,26]. Vector autoregressive models
have been applied to quarterly data for small numbers of
countries, but for annual data with larger numbers of
countries fixed effects models are more consistent. Case-
studies of small economies have been applied to correct
for potential confounding factors, but these micro studies
lack generalisability to larger economies. Instead, to correct
for these potential confounding factors, we correct for total
government spending as well as between-country hetero-
geneity by using fixed effects models [27,28], covering the
years 1995–2007 as follows:
GDPit ¼ αþ βGijt þ φ ∑
j
Gijt
 
−Gijt
 
þ μi þ εit
ð1Þ
Here i is country, j is type of government spending as
described in Table 1, and t is year. GDP is Gross Domes-
tic Product and G is government spending, both in
purchasing-power-parity and constant international 2005
dollars. β is the estimate fiscal multiplier, where β =1 is no
effect, β >1 is a multiplicative effect, and β<1 is a contrac-
tionary effect, and φ is the fiscal multiplier for the total of
all other types of government spending. Standard errors
were clustered by country to reflect non-independence of
sampling.
In the second stage of the analysis, to test whether fis-
cal multipliers differ in recession and non-recessionary
periods, we quantified fiscal multipliers from the reces-
sionary period between 2008 and 2010, then compared
these estimated fiscal multipliers with those from pre-
recession models. We also use out-of sample prediction
Table 1 Types of government spending
Types of government spending
Health Government outlays on health include expenditures
on services provided to individual persons and
services provided on a collective basis; Medical
products, appliances, and equipment; Outpatient,
hospital, and public health services
Education Pre-primary, primary, secondary, post-secondary,
non-tertiary, tertiary education Provision of
education not definable by level; Subsidiary services
to education
Culture Recreational, sporting, cultural, broadcasting,
publishing, religious and other community services;
R&D recreation, culture, and religion
Housing and
community
Housing and community development; Water
supply and street lighting
General public
services
Executive and legislative organs, financial and fiscal
affairs, external affairs, Public debt transactions;
General and public services; Foreign economic aid
Police, fire, and prison services; Law courts; R&D
public order and safety
Defence Military and civil defence; foreign aid defence; R&D
Defence
Environment Waste and waste water management; Pollution
abatement. Protection of biodiversity and landscape
Social protection Sickness and disability, old age, survivors, family and
children, unemployment, housing, and social
exclusion
Economic affairs General economic, commercial, and labour affairs;
agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting, fuel and
energy, mining, manufacturing, construction,
transport, communication and other industries.
Source: EuroStat 2013 edition.
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with observed economic outcomes between 2008 and
2010 and for non-EU economies of the U.S. and Japan.
In subsequent analyses, to assess whether specific multi-
pliers differed across recessionary and non-recessionary
periods, we added an interaction term for the recession-
ary years. All analyses were performed using STATA
v12.1.
Results
Estimating fiscal multipliers by type of government
spending, pre-recession 1995–2007
The forest plot in Figure 1 displays the estimated fiscal
multiplier across eight types of government spending,
which range from −9.8 and 8.4 among various government
spending sectors. Overall, we estimated the fiscal multiplier
for total government spending as 1.61 (95% CI: 1.37 to
1.86), which is consistent with recent independent esti-
mates of the aggregate multiplier [17].
The magnitude of fiscal multipliers differed significantly
by type of government spending. As shown in Figure 1, we
estimated a negative fiscal multiplier of defence spending
(−9.8, 95% CI: -16.7 to −3.0), while the largest positive fis-
cal multipliers were in the sectors of health (4.32, 95% CI:
2.51 to 6.14) and education (8.24, 95% CI: 3.94 to 12.54).
To further evaluate potential mediating factors, we in-
cluded a standard set of determinants of economic
growth, including time dummies, interest rates, un-
employment, trade balance, and domestic investment
(Figure 2a). All factors had associations in the expected
direction (e.g. higher unemployment and interest rates
were negative, whereas greater savings, investment, and
net exports were positive) (see Tables 2a-j). Consistent
with a domestic multiplier mechanism, we found that
when we adjusted for unemployment, the health and
education multipliers were attenuated, but adjusting
for trade balance had no effect. In contrast, when after
adjusting for the trade balance, the defence spending
multiplier was attenuated (β = − 3.62, Table 2c).
We found evidence that the size of the fiscal multiplier
was partly mediated by the degree of domestic absorption
of government spending. Tradable components of govern-
ment spending, like defence spending, were linked to sig-
nificantly more negative trade balance (β = −7.58,
p=0.017) (see Additional file 1: Web Appendix 1). How-
ever, non-tradable areas of the budget, including health
and education had no significant association with the
trade balance (peducation=0.62; phealth= 0.33) (see Additional
file 1: Web Appendix 1).
Observed fiscal multiplier for total government spending,
2008–2010
As a final test, we performed two out-of-sample predic-
tions using our estimates from the 1995–2007 period.
First, we quantified the fiscal multiplier for total govern-
ment spending during the current recessionary period
by identifying the period of significant changes in gov-
ernment spending. Panel a of Figure 3 presents a heat
map showing patterns of government spending change
in the EU (blue = increased, red = decreased spending).
Europe’s governments have differed considerably in their
patterns of expenditure, both overall and across sectors.
Greece, Luxembourg, and Hungary have implemented
large reductions, whereas Germany, Finland, Poland,
and Sweden implemented significant spending in-
creases. In general, community and general public ser-
vices (e.g. civil service) have seen the largest budget
shifts in both positive and negative directions. Social
protection spending has tended to increase during the
recession, while defence spending has tended to de-
cline slightly.
Figure 4 presents the association of changes in govern-
ment spending and in Gross Domestic Product (β = 1.05,
95% CI: 0.49 to 1.61, p<0.01) during the current recession.
As shown in the figure, those countries which have insti-
tuted greater increases in government spending have had
larger rises in per capita GDP.
Second, to further test the generalizability of our find-
ings, we performed an out-of-sample prediction using
GDP data on the US and Japan. As shown in Figure 4,
during the recessionary years of 2008–2010, both US
Figure 1 Pre-recession fiscal multipliers, 1995–2007.
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Figure 2 Adjusted pre-recession fiscal multipliers 1995–2007, by type of government spending. a. Pre-recession fiscal multipliers 1995–2007,
adjusted for time dummies, 1995–2007. b. Pre-recession fiscal multipliers, 1995–2007, adjusted for interest rates, unemployment, trade balance, and domestic
investment. c. Pre-recession fiscal multipliers, 1995–2007, adjusted for interest rates, unemployment, trade balance, domestic investment and time dummies.
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Table 2 Estimated fiscal multipliers, adjusted for unemployment rates, interest rates, trade balance (net exports), and
domestic investment
a. Fiscal multiplier for total government spending
Gross domestic product adjusted for inflation and purchasing-power parity
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total government spending 1.61** 1.60** 1.38** 1.10** 0.64**
(0.12) (0.15) (0.17) (0.10) (0.13)
Unemployment rate — −248.28** −258.67** −364.58** −205.14
(65.84) (86.17) (94.99) (131.78)
Interest rate — — −320.26** −304.69** −269.42**
(94.24) (76.57) (54.26)
Net exports (PPP, Real, per capita) — — — 0.61** 1.31**
(0.16) (0.19)
Total domestic investment (PPP, Real, per capita) — — — — 1.12**
(0.26)
Country-years 296 213 213 213 192
Number of countries 25 19 19 19 19
b. Fiscal multiplier for health spending
Gross domestic product adjusted for inflation and purchasing-power parity
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total health spending 4.32** 3.21** 2.07 2.23* 1.92**
(0.88) (0.98) (1.21) (0.90) (0.53)
Total government spending minus health spending 1.05** 1.26** 1.25** 0.88** 0.39*
(0.33) (0.37) (0.39) (0.27) (0.15)
Unemployment rate — −205.61** −239.03* −336.54** −173.88
(57.89) (87.57) (94.16) (123.10)
Interest rate — — −286.44** −248.57** −203.53**
(83.05) (58.98) (47.45)
Net exports (PPP, Real, per capita) — — — 0.64** 1.24**
(0.17) (0.17)
Total domestic investment (PPP, Real, per capita) — — — — 1.06**
(0.25)
Country-years 296 213 213 213 192
Number of countries 25 19 19 19 19
c. Fiscal multiplier for defense spending
Gross domestic product adjusted for inflation and purchasing-power parity
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total defense spending −9.83** −13.17** −12.92** −8.51 −3.62
(3.32) (3.67) (4.33) (4.77) (2.91)
Total government spending minus defense spending 1.66** 1.62** 1.42** 1.20** 0.71**
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14)
Unemployment rate — −286.58** −301.73** −368.95** −221.27
(66.15) (90.73) (91.27) (124.46)
Interest rate — — −253.31* −263.02** −251.73**
(96.90) (84.62) (55.96)
Net exports (PPP, Real, per capita) — — — 0.47* 1.24**
(0.20) (0.18)
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Table 2 Estimated fiscal multipliers, adjusted for unemployment rates, interest rates, trade balance (net exports), and
domestic investment (Continued)
Total domestic investment (PPP, Real, per capita) — — — — 1.08**
(0.25)
Country-years 296 213 213 213 192
Number of countries 25 19 19 19 19
d. Fiscal multiplier for education spending
Gross domestic product adjusted for inflation and purchasing-power parity
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total education spending 8.24** 6.53** 4.98 5.06** 3.16*
(2.09) (2.10) (2.50) (1.75) (1.11)
Total government spending minus education spending 0.66* 0.88** 0.92** 0.59** 0.33
(0.24) (0.26) (0.27) (0.20) (0.24)
Unemployment rate — −188.09** −227.19** −333.20** −168.63
(58.30) (76.03) (84.09) (117.61)
Interest rate — — −211.45 −184.21 −186.19**
(127.38) (97.00) (61.05)
Net exports (PPP, Real, per capita) — — — 0.63** 1.26**
(0.15) (0.17)
Total domestic investment (PPP, Real, per capita) — — — — 1.11**
(0.22)
Country-years 296 213 213 213 192
Number of countries 25 19 19 19 19
e. Fiscal multiplier for general public services spending
Gross domestic product adjusted for inflation and purchasing-power parity
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total general public services spending 0.62 1.37 2.44* 2.05* 0.81
(0.68) (0.71) (0.89) (0.88) (0.58)
Total government spending minus general public services
spending
1.75** 1.63** 1.21** 0.96** 0.62**
(0.09) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11)
Unemployment rate — −242.48** −279.25** −381.55** −207.43
(67.58) (88.70) (100.42) (132.83)
Interest rate — — −396.26** −372.92** −284.09**
(97.04) (84.44) (59.63)
Net exports (PPP, Real, per capita) — — — 0.60** 1.30**
(0.16) (0.19)
Total domestic investment (PPP, Real, per capita) — — — — 1.12**
(0.27)
Country-years 296 213 213 213 192
Number of countries 25 19 19 19 19
f. Fiscal multiplier for culture & recreation spending
Gross domestic product adjusted for inflation and purchasing-power parity
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total culture & recreation spending 7.57 6.25 4.52 0.83 3.19
(5.51) (4.70) (3.99) (2.96) (3.25)
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Table 2 Estimated fiscal multipliers, adjusted for unemployment rates, interest rates, trade balance (net exports), and
domestic investment (Continued)
Total government spending minus culture & recreation
spending
1.34** 1.38** 1.24** 1.11** 0.57**
(0.32) (0.30) (0.26) (0.19) (0.18)
Unemployment rate — −243.28** −259.08** −365.32** −194.27
(65.52) (88.99) (94.63) (129.50)
Interest rate — — −306.23** −305.79** −258.23**
(98.71) (77.59) (54.23)
Net exports (PPP, Real, per capita) — — — 0.61** 1.31**
(0.16) (0.18)
Total domestic investment (PPP, Real, per capita) — — — — 1.14**
(0.26)
Country-years 296 213 213 213 192
Number of countries 25 19 19 19 19
g. Fiscal multiplier for community spending
Gross domestic product adjusted for inflation and purchasing-power parity
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total community spending −2.50** −2.32** −1.57** −0.91 −0.48
(0.79) (0.63) (0.52) (0.63) (0.58)
Total government spending minus community spending 1.68** 1.67** 1.47** 1.19** 0.73**
(0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.09) (0.11)
Unemployment rate — −231.99** −255.56** −351.38** −198.19
(58.31) (85.00) (90.87) (129.65)
Interest rate — — −254.50** −260.82** −248.63**
(80.86) (69.72) (49.31)
Net exports (PPP, Real, per capita) — — — 0.55** 1.22**
(0.14) (0.19)
Total domestic investment (PPP, Real, per capita) — — — — 1.03**
(0.28)
Country-years 296 213 213 213 192
Number of countries 25 19 19 19 19
h. Fiscal multiplier for environment spending
Gross domestic product adjusted for inflation and purchasing-power parity
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total environment spending 8.39 1.03 −0.46 3.02 3.54
(5.92) (4.73) (4.01) (4.02) (2.67)
Total government spending minus environment spending 1.50** 1.60** 1.40** 1.07** 0.59**
(0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.14) (0.14)
Unemployment rate — −251.28** −269.12** −356.05** −193.58
(67.63) (86.71) (96.24) (128.60)
Interest rate — — −322.65** −301.83** −261.57**
(94.54) (78.69) (56.92)
Net exports (PPP, Real, per capita) — — — 0.62** 1.35**
(0.16) (0.18)
Total domestic investment (PPP, Real, per capita) — — — — 1.14**
(0.26)
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and Japan’s economic performance were predicted by
changes in total government spending.
Comparing recession and pre-recession multipliers
To test whether fiscal multipliers differed across reces-
sionary and non-recessionary periods, we extended our
disaggregated analysis of fiscal multipliers of 1995–2007
to include 2008–2010. As shown in Table 3, there was a
significant interaction of the recessionary period with
the estimated magnitude of fiscal multipliers. Apart from
defence and public service spending, the fiscal multi-
pliers were slightly attenuated during the recessionary
period. The multiplier for total government spending,
for example, was reduced by 0.15 (95% CI: 0.08 to 0.21).
Table 2 Estimated fiscal multipliers, adjusted for unemployment rates, interest rates, trade balance (net exports), and
domestic investment (Continued)
Country-years 296 213 213 213 192
Number of countries 25 19 19 19 19
i. Fiscal multiplier for economic affairs spending
Gross domestic product adjusted for inflation and purchasing-power parity
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total economic affairs spending 0.06 −0.06 0.03 −0.55 −0.29
(0.38) (0.45) (0.40) (0.35) (0.28)
Total government spending minus economic affairs
spending
1.83** 1.80** 1.58** 1.32** 0.84**
(0.14) (0.17) (0.20) (0.14) (0.19)
Unemployment rate — −248.83** −271.11** −388.53** −233.36
(62.40) (75.94) (84.40) (125.08)
Interest rate — — −265.45** −237.34** −238.72**
(91.29) (74.14) (50.65)
Net exports (PPP, Real, per capita) — — — 0.66** 1.27**
(0.13) (0.18)
Total domestic investment (PPP, Real, per capita) — — — — 0.97**
(0.26)
Country-years 296 213 213 213 192
Number of countries 25 19 19 19 19
j. Fiscal multiplier for social protection spending
Gross domestic product adjusted for inflation and purchasing-power parity
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total social protection spending 2.88** 3.25** 2.72** 2.21** 1.29*
(0.45) (0.49) (0.64) (0.49) (0.53)
Total government spending minus social protection
spending
0.83** 0.52 0.57 0.47* 0.36
(0.27) (0.26) (0.31) (0.20) (0.20)
Unemployment rate — −289.73** −323.90** −410.46** −254.49
(61.01) (85.98) (94.19) (142.36)
Interest rate — — −211.82 −217.75* −229.26**
(101.48) (80.13) (59.17)
Net exports (PPP, Real, per capita) — — — 0.57** 1.28**
(0.17) (0.21)
Total domestic investment (PPP, Real, per capita) — — — — 0.98**
(0.31)
Country-years 296 213 213 213 192
Number of countries 25 19 19 19 19
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country to reflect non-independence of sampling.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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Health and education dropped, respectively, by 1.31
(95%: 0.94 to 1.68) and 1.44 (95% CI: 0.80 to 2.08). Social
protection spending was reduced to a lesser degree, by
0.33 (95%: 0.11 to 0.56). However, in the statistical
models, the health, education, and social protection cat-
egories of spending all exhibited statistically significant
and positive growth associations above 1 during the re-
cessionary period.
Sensitivity analysis
We tested the robustness of multiplier estimates to several
alternative model specifications. First, we incorporated a
Figure 3 Budgetary patterns and effects. Panel a. Heat map of budget changes in Europe. Panel b. Association of health with defence spending.
Reeves et al. Globalization and Health 2013, 9:43 Page 9 of 12
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/9/1/43
set of time dummies to correct for cross-EU economic in-
teractions, finding that none of the results was qualita-
tively changed (see Figure 2b). Second, we included both
time dummies and the aforementioned set of controls and
found that direction of the coefficients remained the same
and the health multiplier remained above 1 in the pre-
recessionary period (see Figure 2c). Third, we used alter-
native data sources of government statistics, including the
OECD and World Bank. None of the spending multipliers
qualitatively changed.
To test whether budgetary changes in the recessionary
period were confounded by the depth of recession
(peak-to-trough change in GDP), we assessed the correl-
ation of depth of recession and the depth of subsequent
government spending changes (r = 0.12, p = 0.59). None
of the results was changed when controlling for the cu-
mulative magnitude of recession. Overall, we observed
no correlation among changes in government spending
instituted in different sectors (e.g., changes in health and
defence spending are not correlated, r = 0.02, p =0.90,
panel b of Figure 3), indicating large, exogenous vari-
ation in budgetary choices in response to recession.
Discussion
Government spending changes during recession serves as a
large “quasi-natural experiment”, in which countries experi-
encing relatively similar recessions undertook alternative
budgetary paths. From these differences, we can deduce the
relationship between spending and economic outcomes.
Our findings suggest a total pro-growth effect of overall
government spending, with significant positive fiscal
multipliers in the social protection, health and educa-
tion sectors [29]. These estimates were based on cross-
national models addressing potential economic and
political confounding factors. By empirically evaluating
fiscal multipliers across different sectors, we observed
that changes in government spending corresponded to
similar directional changes in economic growth during
non-recessionary and recessionary periods. Multipliers
estimated from non-recession periods can account for
current changes in economic growth associated with
spending instituted in 2008–2010.
Our study has several limitations. First, the statistical
analysis covers only the first three years of economic re-
cession, given the limited availability of more recent
data. While it has been argued that short-term multi-
pliers may be fail to account for longer-term effects [30],
we found that estimated fiscal multipliers from 1995–
2007 predicted directional changes in subsequent short-
term periods. However, it is possible that longer-term ef-
fects differ from those observed currently, remaining an
important topic for future research. Second, there was
marked heterogeneity in the magnitude of fiscal multi-
pliers. This heterogeneity exists both within and between
countries. Within countries, our results identified that
domestic absorption of spending is a significant factor
mediating the relationship between government spend-
ing and economic growth. When we adjusted for the
trade balance, the multipliers for components of govern-
ment spending which are tradable, such as defence, were
attenuated, whereas semi-tradable components, such as
health and education, were not significantly altered.
Across countries, the magnitude of the fiscal multiplier
is also likely to depend on several country-specific fac-
tors and market characteristics, including the level of
economic development, exchange rate regime, openness
to trade, and public debt dynamics [31,32]. Third, the
data on government spending could not differentiate the
Figure 4 Recessionary fiscal multiplier, 2008–2010.
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growth effects of government spending that acts as a
stimulus from those effects of spending which replaces
spending during recessions. Although it has been sug-
gested that recessionary periods exhibit higher multiplier
effects, as consumer demand is relatively low, we found
contrary evidence that fiscal multipliers were slightly at-
tenuated during periods of recessions compared with pe-
riods of economic growth. This may reflect a tendency
of ‘replacement’ spending, such as when patients turn
from private health care to public health care consump-
tion during recessions, to have smaller pro-growth ef-
fects than ‘stimulus’ spending, which creates new jobs
and income. This interpretation is corroborated by the
observation that health spending was more greatly atten-
uated than total social protection, as the latter is largely
driven by replacement spending both in recessionary
and non-recessionary periods. Another possibility is that
when multiple countries simultaneously introduce budget
reductions, as in the current recession, the potential
multiplier effects of government spending are dampened.
Further disaggregating categories of government spending,
identifying time lags, and evaluating the role of effect
modifiers associated with various forms of government
spending would be a next logical step for research to iden-
tify critical policy strategies during and after the ongoing
economic recession.
Overall, our findings are consistent with recent esti-
mates of fiscal multipliers for total government spending
[28], but extends these estimates in a novel way to evalu-
ate alternative budgetary sectors, compare periods of
non-recession and recession, identify the role of domes-
tic absorption, and include both Europe and the United
States. It also lends support for theories that there are both
‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ components of government
spending [33]. However, in contrast with previous case-
study estimates of the fiscal multipliers associated with de-
fence spending in the United States [3,18,19], we estimated
negative fiscal multipliers for military spending in Europe.
This observation may reflect the presence of a large
defense manufacturing sector in the United States so that
most expenditure is absorbed domestically while, in most
European countries, equipment is imported. It is also
plausible that military spending will vary according to
where the funds are being spent, so the multiplier effect
may be greater in countries with a large domestic defence
industry.
These findings have important implications for policy.
First, these results, taken together with other studies,
corroborates existing evidence that historical prescriptions
for austerity from international financial institutions have
tended to exacerbate economic crises [29,34,35]. Second,
there is a widespread consensus that investment in educa-
tion and in health contribute to economic growth in the
long term, by creating a healthier, better educated, and
therefore more productive labour force [36]. However,
that argument finds little favour among those who view
short term reductions in expenditure as a necessary condi-
tion for the recovery that will permit such investment in
the future. Our findings suggest that, in addition to their
long-term benefits, such investments may actually have
short-term, positive growth effects that make that recov-
ery more likely.
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Table 3 Recessionary (1995–2010) and pre-recession fiscal
multipliers (1995–2007), by type of government spending
Increase in GDP (PPP, per capita, real)
Covariates Estimated
multiplier
1995-2010
Recession
interaction
Estimated
recession
multiplier
(1) (2) (3)
Total Government
Spending
1.28 −0.15 1.13
(0.78 to 1.77) (−0.084 to −0.21) (0.66 to 1.61)
Defence −5.69 −1.71 −7.40
(−15.77 to 4.39) (−6.16 to 2.74) (−18.12 to 3.32)
Community −2.29 −5.99 −8.29
(−4.84 to 0.25) (−1.34 to −10.64) (−13.45 to −3.12)
Economic Affairs 0.45 −1.17 −0.72
(−0.35 to 1.24) (−1.99 to −0.35) (−1.09 to −0.35)
General Public
Services
1.57 −0.45 1.12
(−0.26 to 3.40) (−1.17 to 0.28) (−0.75 to 3.00)
Social Protection 3.04 −0.33 2.71
(2.05 to 4.03) (−0.56 to −0.11) (1.81 to 3.60)
Health 4.92 −1.31 3.61
(2.92 to 6.93) (−1.68 to −0.94) (1.60 to 5.62)
Culture &
Recreation
14.12 −2.38 11.83
(2.16 to 26.26) (−0.67 to −4.10) (−0.92 to 24.58)
Education 9.37 −1.44 7.92
(4.40 to 14.34) (−2.08 to −0.80) (3.19 to 12.66)
Environment 9.49 −6.30 3.18
(−5.03 to 24.00) (−8.93 to −3.68) (−10.60 to 16.97)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are 95% confidence intervals. GDP and all forms of
government spending are adjusted for inflation and purchasing-power parity. Robust
standard errors in parentheses clustered by country to reflect non-independence of
sampling Columns 1–2 report coefficients from equation 2. Column 3 reports the
linear combination of columns 1 and 2. All models control for between-country
variation.
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